Government’s Failure to Secure Undersea Cables
The federal government is falling short in safeguarding the hundreds of undersea communications cables essential for military and civilian operations, which are at risk of sabotage by foreign adversaries, experts informed Congress on Thursday.
Approximately 600 underwater fiber-optic cables linked to the United States form the backbone of the U.S. economy, facilitating over $12 trillion in daily financial transactions, according to testimony presented to the House Homeland Security subcommittee on transportation and maritime security.
Tim Stronge, chief researcher at TeleGeography, emphasized that these cables are vulnerable, critical, and irreplaceable. The hearing coincided with a congressional report revealing China’s advancements in capabilities for severing undersea communications during potential crises.
The report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission indicated that China has increasingly engaged in cable-cutting as a tactic of gray zone pressure and is developing new technologies for such actions in wartime scenarios.
During the subcommittee hearing, experts pointed out that bureaucratic hurdles, insufficient repair vessels, and a pressing need for secondary cable links must be addressed to enhance security for these vital infrastructures.
The panel noted that around 200 cable breaks occur annually, primarily due to accidents. International investigators have accused China and Russia of deliberately damaging undersea cables as part of gray zone operations—actions below conventional conflict levels.
Cable companies facing significant financial losses from disruptions are investing billions into defenses. This includes establishing new cables connected to diverse landing stations to ensure data redundancy. They are also employing advanced detection technologies and maintaining a fleet of repair ships on standby around the clock.
Kevin Fraser from the University of Texas law school stated that secure undersea cables are crucial for America’s ambition to lead in artificial intelligence. He warned that failing to protect this system could lead to severe economic and technological disruptions.
Fraser suggested deploying ten additional cable repair ships at an estimated cost of $300 million each. He also recommended using extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles (XLUUVs) similar to those showcased in recent Chinese military parades.
Stronge criticized Team Telecom, which oversees telecommunications security within the federal government. He argued that a single agency should be designated as the primary authority responsible for undersea cable security.
The current fragmented approach results in confusion rather than a coherent national policy. Stronge noted that other countries have established clear guidelines regarding their undersea cables while the U.S. lacks such strategic direction.
Experts recommend adopting strategies involving abundant cables and rapid repair capabilities as deterrents against sabotage attempts by adversaries. Fraser echoed this sentiment by stating that making sabotage costly would discourage bad actors from targeting submarine cables.
